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Abstract 
Between 2007 and 2014 the United Nations (UN) provided technical, financial and logistical 
assistance to half of all elections held outside of established democracies. Does UN Electoral 
Assistance (UNEA) substantially contribute to the quality of election management? My analysis 
of original data on UNEA in combination with new indicators from the Varieties of 
Democracy- Project suggests that elections with UNEA are on average better managed than 
elections without it. Case studies illustrate that UNEA can effectively supplement and develop 
election management capacities – at least if the incumbent regime complies with the provided 
advice. Nevertheless, serious deficiencies in terms of electoral freedom and fairness remain in 
many UN-supported elections due to challenging political contexts.  
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Introduction 
Electoral assistance is the backbone of international democracy promotion. It has become 
increasingly popular. Between August 2007 and December 2014, the United Nations alone 
assisted 37% of all elections worldwide and half of all elections outside of established 
democracies. 1  Contrary to mere election observation, electoral assistance includes active 
logistical, technical and financial support to electoral processes such as procuring ballot boxes, 
training polling station staff and educating voters. Particularly in countries with weak Election 
Management Bodies (EMB), international support seems critical for the proper conduct of 
elections.  
Despite its practical relevance, academic literature on electoral assistance is scarce 
(Kelley 2012). Prior case studies and evaluation reports address specific experiences and 
methods of electoral assistance. However, a systematic empirical assessment of average effects 
of electoral assistance is lacking. This paper seeks to address this research gap by focusing on a 
central player in electoral assistance, the United Nations (UN).2 
The first part of the paper outlines the practice of UN Electoral Assistance (UNEA) and 
identifies support to election management as its main component. Prior studies have shown 
average positive effects of democracy promotion activities (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson 
2007; Dietrich and Wright 2015). International actors are particularly seen as useful for 
enhancing management capacities needed for credible elections (Kumar and Zeeuw 2006, 282; 
UNDP Evaluation Office 2012). Based on prior research on contentious elections (Pastor 1999, 
Schedler 2013, Kerr 2013, Hyde 2011), I argue that improving election management capacity 
entails many benefits and few risks for political regimes.3 Therefore, we expect on average 
positive effects of UNEA on the quality of election management.  
In the second part of the paper I assess this hypothesis empirically based on an original 
dataset of all cases of UN Electoral Assistance in non-democracies between August 2007 and 
December 2014 and the new data from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem). In order 
to account for the non-random allocation of UNEA I use Heckman treatment effect models 																																																								
1 Author’s calculations based on reports of the UN Secretary General (see below). 
2 The UN focal point for electoral assistance is the Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, but apart from the 
Department for Political Affairs also the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is largely involved in 
electoral assistance. Here, “UN Electoral Assistance” refers to the work of both entities. While the mandate of 
these two entities differs slightly and cooperation between them seems difficult at times (Flores, Morrice, and 
O’Shea 2012), it seems justifiable to address the efforts of both entities jointly in this paper given the ongoing 
efforts to better integrate UNDP and UN mission’s electoral assistance work (see for example UNDP 2014, 31).  
3 Regime – as understood in this paper - refers to both regime actors as well as “sets of formal and informal rules 
that structure the access to state power and its exercise” (Schedler 2013, 17). 
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and find a positive association between the presence of UNEA and improvements in election 
management capacity. This empirical finding supports the initial hypothesis. The underlying 
causal mechanisms are further illustrated based on the elections in Sudan 2010 and Libya 2012. 
However, serious deficiencies remain in many of the studied UN-supported elections due to 
challenging political conditions. In such contexts the UN has to be careful not to be perceived 
as legitimizing fraudulent elections.  
This study is based on multiple sources such as 23 expert interviews with UN officials 
and other electoral stakeholders4, international election observer reports, newspaper articles, 
secondary literature and draws on field research5 in Libya. Additionally, the author was present 
in Sudan during the election period.6 
 
I. UN Electoral Assistance: Practice and Impact  
In the 1990s, international electoral assistance started as ad-hoc support to electoral 
administration and legal advice (Tuccinardi et al. 2006). By now, electoral assistance has become 
widespread. In 2010, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) alone provided 
electoral assistance to 60 countries (UNDP 2011). Most international donors (apart from the 
United States) channel their funds for electoral assistance through the UN (EuropeAid 2008, 
30). Additionally, some regional organizations such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe 
provide electoral assistance, but only to a limited number of countries (Gawrich 2014). Given its 
size and legitimacy as international organization, the UN is perceived as the key player in 
electoral assistance. Therefore, UN Electoral Assistance is the focus of this paper.  
Electoral assistance providers tend to provide support throughout the electoral cycle and 
pay increased attention to the suitability of the environment for elections and to the capacities 
of non-state actors (e.g. UNDP 2007). Hence, UNEA programs can be conceptualized as 
comprising three, interrelated tracks: Election Management, Mediation/Electoral Framework 
and Capacity Development for Non-State Actors (see Table 1)7.  
  
																																																								
4 For methodological clarification on the interviews and a list of interviews see Appendix A1.  
5 5-12 July 2012; 6-13 October 2012 and 25-29 January 2013. 
6 Various activities in Sudan 2009-2011 (among others as consultant for UNDP electoral assistance project). 
7 This conceptualization of UNEA in three tracks builds on my prior knowledge and twelve interviews with current 
or former UN officials concerned with elections between 2012 and 2014 (see Appendix A1). Furthermore, I 
synthesize detailed overviews of typical UNEA activities from the following studies: UNDP (2009), and UNDP 
Evaluation Office (2012). 
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Table 1: Three Tracks of UN Electoral Assistance  
Track 1 “Election Management”:  This traditional track includes supporting the Electoral 
Management Body (EMB) in all aspects of election management, e.g. planning and 
procurement, voter and candidate registration, out-of country voting, Election Day 
management, results counting and tabulation. Other state actors – such as judiciary and security 
sector – might also benefit from UN election-related training.   
Track 2 “Mediation and Electoral Framework”: UN officials mediate between electoral 
stakeholders and provide technical advice about international standards for the legal framework 
of elections. In rare cases UN missions verify the credibility of the electoral process.   
Track 3 “Capacity Development for Non-State Actors”: This track mainly compromises 
education of voters about electoral rules and procedures. Additionally, activities target political 
parties, media and civil society. Often, funds and technical assistance are provided for domestic 
election observers.  
 
Track 1 includes the traditional UNEA activities in the realm of election management 
such as logistical, financial and technical assistance to the EMB, but also other support to state 
actors such as election security trainings. UN officials routinely mediate between electoral 
stakeholders in order to promote agreement on the electoral framework and facilitate 
acceptance of election results. Related to such processes, UN experts often provide technical 
advice about international standards for legal framework.  Both activities are combined to Track 
2. Track 3 captures capacity development and support to non-state actors such as political 
parties, media and civil society as well as voter education.   
The size and priorities of electoral assistance programs vary greatly. Most UNEA 
projects have a small number of technical advisors and a minor budget.8 There are also larger 
projects including substantial amounts of financial assistance. For example, in the time period 
2004-2011, UNDP implemented three projects over $100 Mio and at least seven projects with a 
budget over $20 Mio (UNDP Evaluation Office 2012, 19). In rare cases, the United Nations 
directly organize entire elections, e.g. in Cambodia (1992/-93) or East Timor (2001/-02) 
(Bjornlund 2004, 42).  
Overall, it seems that – despite the ambition of the Electoral Cycle approach – technical 
assistance to electoral management (Track 1) remains the core business of UNEA. The UN 
Department for Political Affairs (2012) clearly states that its main election-related task is to 																																																								
8 UN DPA. 2016. “Elections.” http://www.un.org/undpa/elections (checked on 15.3.16). 
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provide “expertise (…) to national authorities in charge of administering elections in their 
country.” Likewise, a meta-evaluation on two decades of UNDP electoral assistance (UNDP 
Evaluation Office 2012a, 15) names support to election administration the “mainstay” of 
UNDP electoral assistance.  
 
UN Electoral Assistance and Democracy Aid 
Studies specifically assessing the UN’s role in electoral assistance are mainly limited to case 
studies (e.g. Newman and Rich 2004). Furthermore, Ludwig (2004) describes UNEA activities, 
but without much critical analysis. Based on several case studies, Newman and Rich (2004, 29) 
infer that UNEA had a positive role in small societies such as Kosovo, Namibia or East Timor, 
whereas in larger countries such as Cambodia the impact of UNEA is potentially more 
problematic. 
Furthermore, electoral assistance providers have published evaluation reports and 
studies on electoral assistance.9 UNDP’s recent meta-evaluation report provides a relatively 
systematic account of its electoral assistance from 1990 to 2012 (UNDP Evaluation Office 
2012). The study concludes that UNDP often successfully enhances the management of 
elections (ibid. 38). However, the authors also state frankly that UNDP’s electoral assistance has 
no tangible impact on the overall electoral environment if the regime is not committed to 
democratic norms (ibid, 41). 
The broader literature on democracy promotion reflects similar notions. Several large-N 
studies found moderate average positive effects of democracy aid on democracy (Finkel, Pérez-
Liñán, and Seligson 2007; Dietrich and Wright 2015). However, many studies emphasize that 
local political conditions need to be conducive for democracy aid to have a substantial impact.10  
 
Allocation of UN Electoral Assistance  
Democracy aid is not allocated at random (Dietrich and Wright 2015). This is likely to apply for 
UN Electoral Assistance as well. Therefore, for studying the effectiveness of UN Electoral 
Assistance we need to model selection effects and therefore first have to analyze what 
determines UNEA allocation (see Figure 1).   
																																																								
9  For an overview see Rao, Sumedh. 2013. “Helpdesk Research Report: Impact of Election Assistance.” 
Governance and Social Development Resource Centre. http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq895.pdf (checked 
on 20.4.16).  
10 See for example Whitehead (2004, 158), de Zeeuw et al. (2006, 282), Vichery and Sheinberg (2012, 9) and Cornell 
(2012).  
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Figure 1: Allocation and Implementation of UN Electoral Assistance 
 
Note: 1) The regime issues a formal invitation for electoral assistance. 2) The UN decides on this request based 
on an assessment of the regime’s commitment to electoral credibility and electoral infrastructure. 3) If UNEA is 
invited and granted, it can influence election management capacities.  
 
In theory, the allocation of UNEA proceeds in two steps (UNDP 2007, 9ff). First, 
governments formally request UNEA. Second, after receiving a request for electoral assistance, 
the UN considers several political and developmental factors in a needs assessment process 
(UNDP 2007, 9ff). This often includes the deployment of a “Needs Assessment Mission” with 
representatives of UNDP and the UNEA Division (UNDP 2007, 10). Based on their 
recommendations, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs decides whether to 
send UNEA or not (UNDP 2007, 9). 
In practice, it seems that most requests for UNEA were approved, but exact records and 
figures are not available publicly. According to a UN document, 72% of all positive 
recommendations of needs assessment missions have led to “formulation of electoral support 
projects” between 2012 and 2013 (United Nations General Assembly 2015, 23). This supports 
the notion of relative high approval ratings, but in order to calculate the figure of overall 
approval ratings more information would be needed, for example the number of positive 
recommendations of needs assessment missions, which is not available publically.   
One of the reasons for a relatively high success rate of formal requests could be that 
informal mechanisms are at work as well. In many developing countries, the UN maintains a 
strong local presence. Based on expert interviews, it seems plausible that local staff encourages 
governments to request UN Electoral Assistance if they think it is likely that the country passes 
the UN’s allocation criteria and discourages less promising applications in order to avoid 
problems in the relationship with this country. UNEA is likely to be allocated to cases where the 
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strategic interests of both the regime and the UN overlap. Regarding the allocation of UNEA, it 
is therefore important to understand the strategic calculus of 1) the regime and 2) the UN.   
1) For regimes elites, the presence of UN Electoral Assistance has two main potential 
benefits. First, they might be interested in actually improving the quality of election with the 
help of the UN. The logistics of elections are challenging and expensive. International support 
can help to lower the election-related costs for the regime and avoid managerial as well as other 
problems. Second, the mere presence of UN Electoral Assistance can increase electoral 
credibility and hence legitimacy in the national and international arena. Similar arguments can be 
found in the literature on election observation (Hyde 2011, 3f). The main risk for regimes is that 
UN-induced improvements of the electoral process substantially increase their chance of losing 
elections. However, past research has shown that international actors have little leverage to 
prevent electoral manipulation against strong political will of the regime (Elklit 1999). Hence, 
the risk of increasing the chances for electoral defeat for the regime exists, but can be mitigated. 
Therefore, requesting UN Electoral Assistance may appear to be beneficial for most regimes 
seeking to enhance their electoral credibility.  
2) UN officials have two main criteria for granting UNEA: Gaps in electoral 
infrastructure and a country’s “commitment to organize and conduct credible elections” 
(UNDP 2007, 9). The first criterion is quite straightforward and gives prejudice to countries 
with weak prior election management capacities. Regarding the second criterion, the UN 
provides a list of issues to be considered during Needs Assessments Missions including the 
situation of political parties and media (UNDP 2007, 10–15). The UN acknowledges that it runs 
the risk to damage its own reputation by supporting fraudulent elections.11 The more the UN 
supports rigged elections, the less they will be able to enhance the credibility of future electoral 
processes. If a regime has a track record of restricting media freedom and the activities of 
political parties this is likely to be perceived as an indicator for a lacking commitment to credible 
elections. Hence, I assume that such regimes should be less likely to receive UNEA. Finally, the 
UN refrains from allocating UNEA if other actors (particularly regional organizations) are or 
will be providing electoral assistance.12 
Considering both the regime’s and the UN’s strategic interests, a set of key hypotheses 
emerge that can be expected to influence the allocation of UNEA. The UN should be more 
interested in providing electoral assistance to countries with low levels of prior election 
management capacities, because here they are more likely to be able to fill gaps in the electoral 																																																								
11 UNDP (2009: 85) acknowledges this problem and states that careful needs assessment is “a critical factor in 
upholding the reputation of the United Nations as a credible, standard-setting institution in this field.“ 
12 Author interviews with UN officials, New York, June 2013 (# 14,15, 17, see Table A1). 
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infrastructure. Such considerations should resonate with the incumbent regime’s interests of 
achieving more electoral credibility. However, the desire for electoral credibility should be 
higher in countries in transition - in an interval of ambiguity, under foreign occupation or in the 
realm of a period of severe instability. Such elections should also be more likely to attract UN 
support, because they present political openings and are typically high on the international 
agenda (e.g. Libya 2012, Afghanistan 2009, Iraq 2010). Conversely, countries, which do not 
subject the Head of the Executive to multiparty elections, have made a conscious choice to limit 
electoral credibility. Such so-called closed autocracies (Schedler 2009) should be less likely to 
receive UNEA, which applies also in general in repressive contexts.  
 
Effectiveness of UN Electoral Assistance  
Once UNEA is granted, it can be mainly expected to influence election management capacities. 
As discussed above, nowadays, electoral assistance includes not only management support but 
also several other components of the electoral process such as building the capacity of non-state 
electoral stakeholders or advising on the legal framework. Nevertheless, in the area of election 
management capacities a tangible impact of UNEA appears more plausible than in other areas 
of the electoral process for several reasons. First, this area remains the main focus of UNEA as 
discussed above. Second, an election is typically the “largest peacetime mobilization of the 
national population in a short time span” (Schedler and Mozaffar 2002, 1). Hence, the 
management of elections is extremely resource and knowledge intensive (Pastor 1999) whereas 
other areas of the electoral process are more dependent on the political will of the regime than 
on such capacities. International actors can substitute and build capacities, but not the political 
will of national actors (Tolstrup 2014). Therefore, this paper focuses on the UN’s influence on 
election management capacities and not on other aspects of the electoral process.  
However, even the management of elections is often not free from political influence. 
The regime shapes the level of election-related capacities (Vickery, Sheinberg 2012, 9). As 
“gatekeepers” (Tolstrup 2014), regime elites also have the tools and power to limit the influence 
of UNEA on election management. However, for several reasons it seems plausible that – once 
UNEA is invited – most regimes would allow UNEA to at least partially improve the quality of 
election management.  First, through inviting UNEA they have already shown that they are at 
least somewhat interested in electoral credibility. For many regimes strong signals of electoral 
credibility are vital, particularly if there are doubts about their democratic credentials (Hyde 
2011). In established democracies, governments are not likely to survive without electoral 
credibility. Even to many non-democratic regimes signals of electoral credibility might be highly 
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attractive in order to help regimes to gain legitimacy not only in the eyes of international, but 
domestic audiences, too, and deter rivals within the national elites (Birch 2011, 52). For 
example, voters in Nigeria reportedly base their trust in electoral outcomes on their experiences 
with the management of elections (Kerr 2013).  
Second, allowing Election Management Bodies (EMBs) to receive adequate capacities 
does not significantly increase the risk of losing elections for incumbents. There are plenty of 
other avenues for the regime to tilt the playing field – for example by limiting EMB autonomy, 
restricting media freedom or repressing opposition activities (Schedler 2002). Hence, improving 
election management has mainly positive effects for the regime and carries little risks.  
 
Summary and Hypothesis  
The management of elections is not a trivial task – particularly not for regimes with low prior 
election management capacities. If national governments do not have sufficient election-related 
capacities, I expect international electoral assistance seems crucial for ensuring the professional 
conduct of elections by substantially improving the management of elections. 
Nevertheless, UNEA can only improve the quality of elections if regime elites cooperate. 
Most regimes have a sustained interest in receiving more electoral credibility – at least to the 
extent that it does not endanger their chances of re-election. In more open contexts, 
international assistance may provide technical tools necessary to substantially improve election 
quality. However, even in some less conducive contexts, incumbent elites could still be 
interested in incremental improvements in election management in order to appear more 
credible.  Therefore,  
H1: On average, UN Electoral Assistance has a positive effect on EMB capacity. 
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II. UNEA and the Capacity of Election Management 
Bodies   
Data  
Surprisingly, the many comparative data sets on elections do not include reliable information on 
electoral assistance. Hence, based on reports of the UN Secretary General to the General 
Assembly, I compiled the first comprehensive data set on UNEA (between August 2007 and 
December 2014).13 These reports can be considered a reliable data source, because all formal 
requests for UNEA have to be cleared by the very UN department, which is responsible for the 
aforementioned report. 14  Consistent information on the size of the electoral assistance 
operations is unfortunately not available. Therefore, the subsequent empirical analysis is based 
on binary information of whether an election was supported by the UN.  
National electoral events in polities with 500 000 inhabitants or more are the unit of 
analysis based on the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset 
(V.4) (Hyde and Marinov 2012).15 Outside of established democracies,16 286 national elections 
took place in between 2007 and 2014. 48% of them have received UN Electoral Assistance, 
which is a remarkable large share. Sub-Saharan Africa is a hot spot for UNEA with 75% of 
elections receiving support. In the other world regions UN supported the following share of 
elections: 49% Asia, 41% Middle East and North Africa (MENA); 44% Latin America; 24% 
Eastern Europe and Post-Soviet Asia (Figure 2).  
																																																								
13 The UN Secretary General submits biannual reports to the General Assembly on UNEA. In the annexes of the 
last four reports from 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015, all UN assisted electoral processes are listed (UN document 
A/64/304, A/66/314, A/68/301 and A/70/306). Unfortunately, earlier reports do not include these detailed 
data (for 2007 see UN document A/62/293). 
14 Author interview UN staff (#14 and 17; see Table A1); UNDP might have delivered small electoral assistance 
projects to elections that are not captured by the report.   
15This includes legislative and executive elections and elections for constituent assemblies. Following Hyde, if 
executive and legislative elections take place on the same day, only executive elections are kept in the data set as 
“general” election. Potential second rounds of elections are not included (Hyde 2011, 62). NELDA 4 only 
reaches until 2012. A research assistant has updated the election data for 2013-14 based on the NELDA coding 
rules. 
16 Following common practice in the field, all countries with a Freedom House Political Rights Score of 1 are 
considered established or liberal democracies (Schedler 2013, 189f). In such context, UNEA is rare (7% of all 
national elections in the studied time period). Therefore, I exclude these cases from the analysis.  
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Figure 2: Countries with UNEA 2007-2014 
 
Note: Own illustration using spmap. Data source for UNEA as described above.  
 
Dependent Variable: Capacity of Election Management  
As discussed before, the strongest component of UNEA is its support to the EMB. Hence, 
when thinking about the effect of UNEA, -first and foremost- we can expect a contribution of 
UNEA to the capacity of the EMB.  Therefore, the level of EMB capacity is the main 
dependent variable of this study, for which I take an indicator from the Varieties of Democracy 
(V-Dem) data set (Version 5.0; Coppedge et al. 2015).  
The V-Dem project has compiled a huge data set on 400 different aspects of democracy 
with the help of more than 2600 expert coders from the entire world (Coppedge et al. 2015b: 2). 
The expert coders are typically academics from the respective country and are recognized 
experts on a specific sub-set of V-Dem indicators (Coppedge et al. 2015b: 2-3). To ensure 
reliability of the indicators, five expert coders per country are typically assigned to each indicator 
and also record their confidence in their assessment.  These ratings were then aggregated based 
on a Bayesian ordinal item response theory model – which takes the reliability of individual 
coders into account - to the point estimates used in the regression analysis of paper (Pemstein et 
al. 2015). The described measures enhance the reliability of the data. 
For the indicator in question, V-Dem expert coders assessed whether the EMB has 
“sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election” on a scale from 0 (No) 
to 4 (Yes) (Coppedge et al. 2015: 74). V-Dem data is available as immediate measurement model 
output with 0 representing approximately the mean of all country-years, which is used here as 
dependent variable (see Pemstein et al. 2015: 37 and histogram in Appendix Figure A1). For 
better substantive interpretation, the data have also been reconverted to the codebook scale 
ranging from 0 to 4 (OSP-Version).  
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On average, in the studied sample of 217 elections17, the UN-supported EMBs have a lower 
capacity (2.26 on the V-Dem EMB capacity indicator; OSP version) than the non-supported 
EMBs (2.78).  This does not surprise, because the UN aims to specifically provide support to 
those countries with weak EMBs. Hence, I expect the capacity of the EMB at the last election 
to influence UNEA selection considerations as well as the level of EMB capacity at the studied 
election. The important question is how much the EMB capacity changes compared to the last 
election and if this change could be attributable to the involvement of the UN. Therefore, I 
control for EMB capacity at the prior election both in selection and main model. Furthermore, 
findings hold when estimated with change in EMB capacity (the difference in EMB capacity at 
the studied election compared to the prior) as dependent variable (Model 5 on Table A3).  
The V-Dem indicator more precisely covers the capacity of the EMB than other 
available cross-national indicator of election quality. Nevertheless, for external validity it is 
important to note that it correlates highly with an indicator of overall election quality from 
Freedom House (Pearson’s r=0.64). Furthermore, the main findings of this paper hold when I 
estimate the regression models not with V-Dem data but with the Freedom House Electoral 
Process score (see Model 4 on Table A3).  
 
Further Control Variables 
Additionally, various control variables are included (for summary statistics see Table A2). As 
discussed, closed autocracies – authoritarian regimes without multiparty elections for the Head 
of the Executive – are expected to be less likely to attract UNEA. Hence, a dummy for closed 
autocracies is created based on two criteria: A FH Political Rights Score of 4 or greater and 
absence of multiparty elections for the head of the executive (V-Dem data).18 Likewise, UNEA 
is less likely to take place in countries that severely limit the autonomy of opposition parties 
(discussed above). Therefore, a variable from the V-Dem data set on opposition autonomy is 
included (low: no opposition parties allowed; high: opposition parties independent of the ruling 
regime).   
Conversely, transitional elections – taking place in an interval of ambiguity, under 
foreign occupation or in the realm of a period of severe instability – are more likely to attract 
UN support. Therefore, the absence of a stable regime is measured with a dummy variable from 
																																																								
17 This number is different from the total sample of 286 elections, because V-Dem data is only available for 217 
elections.  
18 The concept of closed autocracies is based on Schedler (2013: 189f). Absence of multiparty elections is indicated 
with a score of 0 or 1 on V-Dem variables v2elmulpar_ord_ex or v2elmulpar_ord_leg, depending on the 
institutional configuration (Coppedge et al. 2015: 74).   
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Polity IV’s “Standardized Authority Codes.”19 Post-conflict elections are controlled for with a 
dummy variable signifying an armed conflict during the ten years prior to the election based on 
data from the widely used UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; taken 
from Teorell et al. 2015). The wealth of a country might play a role both for allocation of 
UNEA and for election quality. Hence, the log of GDP per capita (constant 2005 USD; t-1) and 
aid dependency (net Official Development Assistance to GDP ratio; t-1) are added as control 
variables. Furthermore, resource wealth may reduce a regime’s incentive to gain electoral 
legitimacy and hence improve the quality of elections. Therefore, the share of oil 
revenues/GDP is added as control variable.20  
Finally, UNEA is distributed unevenly among world regions (see above). UNEA is less 
present in East Europe/Post-Communist Asia - probably due to the engagement of the OSCE 
in this region. 21 Hence, a dummy variable for this world region is added to the selection 
equation. 
  
Treatment Effect Models  
To summarize, the theoretical discussion above allows us to derive two main implications that 
are testable with quantitative methods. I would expect election quality – in particular the quality 
of election management – to improve in UN-supported elections. As discussed above, UNEA is 
not allocated at random, but purposefully to some elections and not others. Such selection 
considerations need to be taken into account when modeling the effect of UNEA. To this end I 
estimate Heckman-type treatment effect models with EMB capacity as dependent variable (Guo 
and Fraser 2015, 100–1).22 All models are run with robust standard errors clustered by country 
to take autocorrelation of observations in the same country into account (N= 217; 114 
countries) and are using maximum likelihood estimation.  
																																																								
19 For a description of the “Standardized Authority Codes” see Marshall, Monty G., Robert T.; Gurr, and Keith 
Jaggers. 2013. “Polity IV Project. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013.” Dataset Users’ 
Manual, Center for Systemic Peace. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2013.pdf (checked on 
15.11.15), p.19. 
20  Source for the economic indicator are the World Bank’s “World Development Indicators.” 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (checked on 15.11.15). 
21 Author interviews with UN officials (#14, 16 and 17; see Table A1). On the engagement of the OSCE see 
Gawrich (2014) 
22 Regression equation: EMB capacity!= !!ß + !"#$!! + !!  
Selection equation: !"#$!∗ =  !!! +  !!  with !"#$! = 1 if !"#$!∗ > 0, and  !"#$! = 0 otherwise;  
 !!  is a vectors for the covariates of UNEA and !! for the covariates of EMB capacity; ! and !  are parameter 
vectors and ! is a scalar parameter. !! and !! are bivariate normal with mean zero and covariance matrix of !! !! 1  (see Guo et al. 2015, 97).  
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Table 2: Treatment Effect Models with EMB Capacity as Dependent Variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 
EMB Capacity   
UNEA 0.521** 0.527** 
 (0.123) (0.130) 
   
EMB Capacities (Prior Election) 0.888** 0.885** 
 (0.0453) (0.0496) 
   
Closed Autocracy 0.177+ 0.159 
 (0.0995) (0.0992) 
   
Post-Conflict 0.123+ 0.125+ 
 (0.0645) (0.0652) 
   
GDP per capita (logged; t-1) 0.200** 0.180** 
 (0.0565) (0.0545) 
   
In Transition  -0.0630 
  (0.227) 
   
Oil revenues/GDP (log; t-1)  0.00137 
  (0.0194) 
   
Aid Dependency (t-1)  -0.00413 
  (0.00610) 
   
Constant -1.742** -1.564** 
 (0.464) (0.447) 
UN Electoral Assistance   
EMB Capacities (Prior Election) -0.239+ -0.234 
 (0.139) (0.145) 
   
Opposition Autonomy (t-1) 0.198* 0.198+ 
 (0.0961) (0.101) 
   
In Transition 2.364** 2.489* 
 (0.892) (1.064) 
   
Closed Autocracy -0.684* -0.650+ 
 (0.333) (0.341) 
   
Post-Conflict -0.136 -0.138 
 (0.239) (0.228) 
   
Aid Dependency (t-1) 0.00604 0.0139 
 (0.00778) (0.0123) 
   
GDP per capita (logged; t-1) -0.701** -0.661** 
 (0.150) (0.149) 
   
East Europe/Post-Soviet Asia -0.229 -0.226 
 (0.261) (0.263) 
   
Constant 5.412** 5.056** 
 (1.154) (1.163) 
Observations 217 217 
AIC 384.4 388.3 
Wald test of != 0: !! 13.56** 12.82** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country); + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01  
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Model 1 estimates that the likelihood of UNEA allocation decreases with increasing 
EMB capacities at prior elections and increases with opposition autonomy (Table 2). Taking 
these selection effects into consideration, the presence of UNEA is correlated with a higher 
EMB capacity. Hence, the predicted increase at UN presence of 0. 521 points is substantially 
large considering that the V-Dem indicator for EMB capacity ranges from -1.93 (min) to 2.84 
(max). Model 2 includes all of the above-discussed control variables and still estimates a 
substantially relevant effect (0.527 points) on EMB capacity (Model 2). 
The covariates show effects in the expected directions. Noteworthy is that the likelihood 
of UNEA allocation is estimated to decrease in closed autocracies, but increases in transitional 
contexts as expected. Furthermore, EMB quality is estimated to increases with per capita GDP 
and in post-conflict contexts.  
Treatment effect models are appropriate if the error terms of the selection and the 
regression equation are likely to correlate. This can be assessed with a Wald test, which 
compares independent selection and main models with the treatment effect model (Guo et al. 
2015, 103). Based on this likelihood ration test, the null hypothesis (no correlation of error 
terms) can be rejected for all two models (p<0.01). This supports the specification as treatment 
effect model.   
For robustness purposes, Model 2 is estimated with alternative dependent variables: The 
change of the level of EMB capacity (compared to the prior election) (Model 3) and the 
Freedom House electoral process score (Model 4). Furthermore, Model 2 is estimated with a 
different indicator for prior EMB capacities. In countries with long interruptions of the electoral 
cycle the EMB capacity could diminish. Hence, for countries with no elections for 7 years or 
longer ago this indicator is set to 0 (Model 5).23 Findings for Model 3, 4 and 5 are substantially 
the same as Model 2 (see Table A3 in Appendix). This increases confidence in reliability of the 
V-Dem indicators and the findings. Furthermore, improvements in EMB capacities are 
predicted to be less likely in countries with high prior EMB capacities (Model 3). This supports 
the notion that EMB capacity improvements are more likely in contexts with weak prior EMB 
capacities. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
23 This variable is based on the OSP version of the V-Dem data, which transforms the measurement model output 
(used in the regression analysis) back to the original codebook scale (see Pemstein et al. 2015). In this version of 
the data a score of 0 indicates non-sufficient electoral management capacities.  
	 17	
Discussion  
Large-scale country-level development interventions – such as UNEA – cannot be studied 
under experimental conditions. The estimated treatment effect models take key non-random 
selection considerations into account as well as other determinants of the level of EMB 
capacity. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that factors systematically influence the allocation 
of UNEA and/or the capacity of the EMB that where not accounted for in the models. 
Therefore, the estimated differences in EMB capacity in UN-supported elections compared to 
non-supported cannot unambiguously be fully attributed to UNEA. Nevertheless, the empirical 
findings provide support for the notion that UNEA – on average – helps to improve EMB 
capacity.  
Particularly in countries with weak prior election management capacities, a key role for 
UNEA seems plausible. Take for instance the first Post-Gadhafi elections in Libya in 2012. The 
Libyan interim authorities faced the daunting task of building an election management body 
from scratch after living for 42 years under a totalitarian ruler who demonized representative 
institutions and processes (International Crisis Group 2011, 7). Around 55 UN advisors assisted 
the Libyan High National Election Commission (HNEC) on all matters of the technical, legal 
and logistical side of elections (UN Security Council 2012). This included operations, data 
management, procedures and training, candidate and entity certification, public relations, 
election security and civic and voter education (EU EAT 9.7.12, 19). The result was a free and 
fair election24 that the EU chief election observer, Lambsdorff, praised as “one of the best I 
have seen so far.”25 Given the absence of prior experience with managing elections in Libya, it is 
highly doubtful that the Libyan elections would have reached international standards without 
substantial UN advice and logistical support.26 For example, on the eve of elections a helicopter 
with voting material near Benghazi was shot.27 UN election experts were instrumental for 
quickly organizing additional ballots from printers abroad. 28 These efforts led to a professionally 
managed election, but did not prevent Libya from sliding down to chaos in subsequent years.  
In Sudan the first multiparty elections in 24 years took place in 2010. Given the weak 
capacity Sudanese state, elections in – at that time - Africa’s largest country were a huge 																																																								
24 See report of the EU election observers (EU EAT 2012). V-Dem also notes the 2012 elections in Libya as fully 
free and fair (Coppedge et al. 2015).  
25 Libya Herald. 2012. “The Libyan Elections: ``One of the Best I Have Seen so Far’' - EU Chief Monitor,” 
October. 
26 This view has been confirmed in statements of and expert interviews with key Libyan electoral stakeholders, e.g. 
Author interview with senior HNEC official, Tripoli, 27.January 2013; General National Congress member 
Abdallah, public speech, 9.11.12, HBS, Berlin.  
27 AJE. 2012. “Election Helicopter Attacked in Libya.” July. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/07/20127617053610274.html (checked on 15.3.16). 
28 Author interviews with senior HNEC officer, Tripoli, 27.January 2013; and with UN official, Tripoli, 7.July 2012. 
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logistical challenge. The UN provided large-scale logistical, technical as well as financial electoral 
assistance worth around 139.2 Mio USD.29  International funds were among others used for 
ballot boxes, ballot paper and capacity development of electoral stakeholders. The election-
related cooperation between UNDP and the UN peace-keeping mission (UNMIS) was not free 
from challenges (Flores, Morrice, and O’Shea 2012, xvi). This may have affected the 
effectiveness of electoral assistance. Furthermore, EU election observers report several cases, 
where Sudanese authorities discarded the technical advice of international experts, which 
resulted in lower quality polls (EU EOM Sudan 2010, 7; 23). For example, the technologies and 
procedures provided by international advisors for transparent vote tabulation and counting 
processes were set-aside during the electoral exercise. Hence, the results tabulation and counting 
process “became untrustworthy and results were untraceable” (EU EOM Sudan 2010, 5). 
Overall, serious deficiencies in the management of elections and the freedom and fairness of the 
electoral exercise were noted.30 Nevertheless, in light of the weak Sudanese administrative 
capacities and lacking electoral experience, it is likely that elections in 2010 would have turned 
out even worse without UN support. 
The Sudanese case furthermore underscores the limitations of international electoral 
assistance. If incumbents chose to manipulate the electoral process, international actors can do 
little to prevent it (Elklit 1999).  Due to Sudan’s good relationships with China, Russia and gulf 
countries, pro-democratic international actors had little leverage on the Sudanese government.31 
Building on 21 years of rule, the Sudanese president was confident to be able to extent his rule 
even after flawed elections (Musso 2012; Zahar 2012). Furthermore, even flawed elections may 
contribute to authoritarian legitimacy (Schedler 2013: 274). This raises questions about potential 
counter-intended effects of electoral assistance. According to de Zeeuw (2005) democracy 
assistance “may also have the effect of legitimizing authoritarian practices.” Thomas Carothers 
(2015, 62) voices deep skepticism about electoral assistance in autocracies. Indeed, 42% of the 
studied UN-supported elections did not turn out free and fair according to V-Dem data.32 In 
such contexts, the UN risks being perceived as legitimizing deeply flawed electoral practices. 
This may have the counter-intended effect of adding legitimacy to non-democratic rulers and 
risks jeopardizing the UN’s ability of conveying credibility to electoral exercises.  																																																								
29 International donors (UK, EU, Japan, Netherlands and others) provided 84.2 Mio USD for electoral assistance 
through a UNDP basket fund (UNDP Sudan 2010, 1). The UN peace keeping mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 
provided significant technical and logistical support to elections – officially estimated at 55 Mio USD (UNDP 
Sudan 2010, 1).  
30 See for example report of the EU observers (EU EOM Sudan 2010); V-Dem experts rated the 2010 election in 
Sudan as “not really” free and free and “not really” well-administered (Coppedge et al. 2015).  
31 On Sudan’s partners see: Medani (2011); On the importance of leverage for the effectiveness of democracy 
promotion see: Levitsky and Way (2006). 
32 Own calculations based on V-Dem data (Coppedge et al. 2015). 
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Conclusions 
The management of elections – particularly without prior experience – can be a daunting task. 
In many cases, international support seems essential for ensuring the proper conduct of 
elections. Hence, on average UN-supported elections should be better managed than non-
supported elections. The empirical analysis of 217 elections outside of established democracies 
supports this notion. In times of readily available international electoral assistance, lacking 
electoral experience and limited state capacities cannot be used as an excuse for bad elections, as 
the free and fair elections in Libya 2012 underscore. However, the chaotic development in Libya 
after the 2012 elections illustrates once more that professionally managed elections are no 
guarantee for successful transition processes.  
Furthermore, many autocrats are not interested in substantially improving the quality of 
their elections (Sudan 2010). They may invite UNEA due to national or international pressure, 
but continue to substantially manipulate electoral process. In such contexts, UN Electoral 
Assistance risks becoming a fig leaf for a deeply flawed voting exercise. Although international 
support for elections in such contexts might incrementally improve elections, miracles should 
not be expected. If opposition politicians are tortured and media censored, it is unlikely that 
elections turn out free and fair. Conversely, international electoral assistance might be 
interpreted as international acceptance of non-democratic elections. 
Such risks should be avoided through a more careful selection strategy. Already now, the 
UN avoids – but not excludes – countries with limited freedom for the opposition. In order to 
avoid legitimizing autocrats without gains in democratization, electoral assistance should not be 
considered advisable if substantial formal or informal obstacles preclude meaningful electoral 
competition. Further research is needed to assess the causal link between electoral assistance 
and authoritarian legitimacy. 
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Appendix 
 
A1: Expert Interviews  
 
Expert interviews are a useful tool to understand internal mechanisms of the organization they 
work for, draw on the experiences of the interviewee and to gain information that is not 
available through other sources. Against the background of the gaps in academic literature on 
electoral assistance, expert interviews provided valuable insights for this research project.  
Candidates for interviews were mainly experienced UN officials in the field of electoral 
assistance, election commission staff, civil society activists and other electoral stakeholders. 
Access to resourceful interviewees was difficult due to the political sensitive nature of my 
dissertation topic and time constraints on the side of respondents. Nevertheless, through prior 
contacts and snowball sampling, I interviewed 23 experts in New York, Tripoli, Berlin and other 
locations (see Table A1).  
Particularly useful were twelve interviews with active or former UN officials, who 
helped to clarify many specific questions about UNEA ranging from Needs Assessments to 
outreach strategies, which are not addressed in the scarce literature. Other interviews were 
particularly helpful to shed light on perceptions of electoral assistance and country-specific 
issues, such as interviews with country experts. 
In the interviews, I mainly aimed at gaining more thorough knowledge about facts, 
organizational procedures and positions that were relevant for this research project. As it is 
advised for problem-centered interviews, I conducted the interviews in a semi-structured 
fashion with open questions (Mosley 2013). Most interviews were conducted under the 
condition of anonymity and/or non-attribution. Therefore, I do not report the names of the 
interview partners.  
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Table A1: List of Expert Interviews  
 
# Name Function Place Date 
1 UN official 1  Senior managerial staff UNDP/UNSMIL 
Electoral Assistance Team  
Tripoli 7.7.12 
2 EU official 1 Head of Election/Democracy Unit, 
European External Action Service  
Tripoli 9.7.12 
3 UN official 2 Senior technical staff UNDP/UNSMIL 
Electoral Assistance Team 
Tripoli 10.7.12 
4 EU official 2 Election desk, EU delegation to Libya  Tripoli 10.7.12 
5 Libyan activist 1 Libyan civil society activist Tripoli 12.10.12 
6 NDI official Senior Resident Director, National 
Democratic Institute (NDI)  
Tripoli 8.10.12 
7 GIGA expert 1 Libya expert, German Institute for Global 
and Area Studies 
Berlin 24.10.12  
8 HNEC official 1 Election Commissioner, High National 
Election Commission 
Tripoli 28.1.13 
9 Diplomat 1 Western embassy representative Tripoli 28.1.13 
10 UN official 3 Former head of UN Mission in Sudan  The Hague 22.4.13 
11 IFES official 1 Senior global election expert, International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)  
Cambridge, MA 4.6.13 
12 IFES official 2 Senior IFES staff Cambridge, MA 4.6.13 
13 UN official 4 Elections Advisor, UNDP New York 6.6.13 
14 UN official 5  Elections Advisor, UNDP New York 7.6.13 
15 UN official 6 Governance specialist, UNDP  New York 10.6.13 
16 UN official 7 Senior staff, Regional Bureau for Africa 
(UNDP)  
New York 10.6.13 
17 UN official 8 Senior staff, UN Electoral Assistance 
Division 
New York 11.6.13 
18 UN official 9 Political Participation Advisor, UN Women  New York 11.6.13 
19 UN official 10 Former UNDP governance specialist Sudan New York 11.6.13 
20 SWP expert 1  Libya expert, German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs (SWP) 
Berlin 10.10.13 
21 UN official 11 Former UNDP election advisor DR Congo Berlin 20.12.13 
22 UN official 12 Former UN Mission in Sudan senior staff Erfurt 28.2.14 
23 UN official 12 Former national election advisor for UNDP 
Nigeria 
Skype  19.12.14 
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A2: Statistical Appendix 
 
Table A2: Summary Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
UNEA 217 .5069124 .5011082 0 1 
EMB Capacity 217 .6712694  . 9256287   -1.930825 . 2.836461 
EMB Capacities (Prior election) 217 .6633813 .9611088 -1.990122 2.836461 
Oil revenues/GDP (log; t-1) 217 1.004082 1.298407 0 4.198744 
In Transition 217 .0506912 .2198737 0 1 
Opposition Autonomy (t-1) 217 .9486768 1.107679 -3.072701 2.966602 
Post-Conflict 217 .3456221 .4766703 0 1 
Closed Autocracy 217 .1105991 .3143602 0 1 
Aid Dependency (t-1) 217 5.38715 10.58447 0 109.6166 
GDP per capita (log; t-1) 217 7.481311 1.100798 4.988754 10.43826 
East Europe/Post-Soviet Asia 217 .2534562 .4359956 0 1 
      
   
 
Figure A1: Histogram Dependent Variable: Capacity of Election Management Body 
(2007-2014)  
 
Source: V-Dem dataset 5.0 (Coppedge et al 2015) 
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Table A3: Treatment Effect Models (Robustness Checks) 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Main    
UNEA 0.527** 5.448** 0.733** 
 (0.130) (0.647) (0.164) 
    
EMB Capacities (Last Election) -0.115* 1.229**  
 (0.0496) (0.362)  
    
EMB Capacities (Prior Election;  
OSP version1) 
 
  0.791** 
(0.0841) 
    
In Transition -0.0630 -2.025* -0.0127 
 (0.227) (0.795) (0.261) 
    
Closed Autocracy 0.159 -3.110** 0.230 
 (0.0992) (0.827) (0.145) 
    
Post-Conflict 0.125+ -0.112 0.276** 
 (0.0652) (0.666) (0.0872) 
    
GDP per capita (logged; t-1) 0.180** 2.174** 0.304** 
 (0.0545) (0.348) (0.0689) 
    
Oil revenues/GDP (log; t-1 0.00137 -0.920** -0.0375 
 (0.0194) (0.179) (0.0309) 
    
Aid Dependency (t-1) -0.00413 0.00421 -0.00653 
 (0.00610) (0.0257) (0.00665) 
    
Constant -1.564** -11.80** -3.933** 
 (0.447) (2.832) (0.460) 
UN Electoral Assistance    
EMB Capacities (Last Election) -0.234 -0.344**  
 (0.145) (0.130)  
    
Opposition Autonomy (t-1) 0.198+ 0.572** 0.338** 
 (0.101) (0.125) (0.102) 
    
In Transition 2.489* 1.341** 1.868* 
 (1.064) (0.499) (0.849) 
    
Post-Conflict -0.138 -0.318 -0.191 
 (0.228) (0.262) (0.233) 
    
Closed Autocracy -0.650+ -0.0961 -0.417 
 (0.341) (0.377) (0.351) 
    
Aid Dependency (t-1) 0.0139 0.00780 0.0102 
 (0.0123) (0.0132) (0.0114) 
    
GDP per capita (logged; t-1) -0.661** -0.712** -0.746** 
 (0.149) (0.161) (0.142) 
    
East Europe/Post-Soviet Asia -0.226 -0.409+ -0.200 
 (0.263) (0.231) (0.263) 
    
EMB Capacities (Prior Election;  
OSP version1) 
 
  -0.244+ 
(0.141) 
    
Constant 5.056** 5.220** 5.964** 
 (1.163) (1.269) (1.083) 
Observations 217 239 217 
AIC 388.3 1356.8 525.4 
Wald test of != 0: !! 12.82 43.46 14.64 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country); + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Note: Dependent variable Model 3 is change in EMB capacity compared to prior election; Dependent Variable in Model 4 is the Freedom House Electoral Process score 
(0= not free and fair; 12 = free and fair); Dependent Variable in Model 5 is the level of EMB capacity (V-Dem).   
1 With EMB capacity set to 0 if prior election was more than 6 years ago; This variable is based on the OSP version of the V-Dem data, which transforms the 
measurement model output (used in the regression analysis) back to the original codebook scale (see Coppedge et al 2015). In this version of the data a score of 0 indicates 
non-sufficient electoral management capacities. 
 
